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Abstract
The theory of strategic trade policy yields ambiguous recommendations for assistance
to exporting  rms in oligopolistic industries. However, some writers have suggested
that investment subsidies are a more robust recommendation than export subsidies.
We show that, although ambiguous in principle, the case for investment subsidies is
reasonably robust in practice. Except when functional forms exhibit arbitrary non-
linearities, it holds under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, with either cost-
reducing or market-expanding investment, and with or without spillovers. Only if
 rms have strong asymmetries in their investment behaviour and engage in Bertrand
competition is an investment tax clearly justi ed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Enormous sums are spent by governments throughout the world in direct
assistance to private industry. Yet economic theory provides little guidance
on how these funds should be disbursed. This is even true of the theory of
strategic trade policy, the branch of international trade theory that comes
closest to the concerns of governments seeking to foster ‘national cham-
pions’. Even when the interests of consumers and foreign  rms are ignored,
the theory yields ambiguous recommendations for assistance to exporting
 rms in oligopolistic industries. Whereas Brander and Spencer (1985)
demonstrated that an export subsidy is optimal when  rms compete in
quantities, Eaton and Grossman (1986) showed that if  rms compete in
prices then an export tax is optimal. Since there are no strong grounds for
determining whether quantity or price competition is more plausible, the
theory falls at the  rst hurdle in providing usable guidelines for policy
making.
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However, in recent years a different strand of the literature has re-
examined this issue. In particular, it has considered the desirability of
‘industrial policy’, in the sense of subsidies to spending (such as investment
in marketing or R&D) which is incurred prior to direct market competition
between  rms. Brander (1995) conjectured that investment subsidies are a
more robust recommendation than export subsidies. Evidence for this view
has been provided by Spencer and Brander (1983), Bagwell and Staiger
(1994), Maggi (1996), and Neary and Leahy (2000) in a number of special
models.1 All the studies that have been carried out to date  nd that, when
exports cannot be subsidized directly, subsidies to investment are justi ed
irrespective of the nature of product-market competition. Why one form of
assistance should be apparently so robust while the other is not seems
worthy of investigation.
A different reason for interest in industrial policy is a practical one.
Explicit export subsidies are prohibited by the World Trade Organization,
but similar bans do not apply to investment subsidies. (Although they may
be constrained in other ways: for example, the European Commission limits
the extent of assistance that can be given to national  rms.) Therefore, from
a policy perspective, it is more pertinent to consider the optimality of
subsidies to investment than to exports. By contrast, most of the literature on
policy towards oligopolistic  rms in open economies has concentrated on
trade policy, either in isolation or in conjunction with optimal industrial
policy. (See Brander, 1995; Neary and Leahy, 2000 for overviews.)2
In this paper, we re-examine the robustness of industrial policy. In
particular, we explore the robustness of the Brander conjecture, that positive
investment subsidies are optimal irrespective of the nature of market
competition between  rms. We  rst present, in Section 2, a relatively
general model and derive the optimal investment subsidy. We then turn in
Section 3 to a range of special cases and try to isolate the forces that work
for and against subsidizing investment. Section 4 concludes with a summary
of results.
2. OPTIMAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN THE GENERAL
MODEL
2.1 The  rms’ decision problem
We consider a model in which a home and a foreign  rm compete on a
single market. The full game is a three-stage one, with the home government
setting the level of an investment subsidy s in the  rst stage. In the second
stage, corresponding to the pre-market period, the home and foreign  rms
choose investment levels k and k* respectively. Investment may reduce
production costs, may shift the demand function facing the  rm, or both.
Finally, in the third stage, corresponding to the market period, the  rms
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choose ‘actions’ A and B respectively. These actions may be either outputs
or prices. Each  rm’s pro ts depend on its own and its rival’s investment
levels and market actions and on the home government’s investment
subsidy, s. The home  rm’s total pro ts p are:
p (k, k*, A, B, s) 5 p (k, k*, A, B) 1 sk (1)
where p represents operating pro ts (sales revenue less total costs) and sk is
the  rm’s subsidy income. The foreign  rm’s pro ts are determined in the
same way, except that we simplify by assuming that it does not receive any
subsidies from its government. It therefore maximizes the function:
p *(k, k*, A, B) (2)
The nature of interactions between  rms is quite general in this speci ca-
tion. In particular, each  rm’s pro ts may depend directly on its rival’s
investment level as well as on its own. These cross-dependencies (of p on k*
and p * on k) re ect direct spillovers between  rms.
It is natural to assume that investment decisions are taken before
decisions on prices or quantities. This, in turn, makes it natural to restrict
attention to the case of a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Facing a given
home subsidy,  rms choose their investment levels in the pre-market period,
taking into account the impact of these choices in the market period. Then,
after investments are sunk, they choose their market actions given produc-
tion costs and demands determined by past investment decisions. The
market-period Nash equilibrium in actions is characterized by the  rst-order
conditions:
p A(k, k
*, A, B) 5 0 and p *B(k, k
*, A, B) 5 0 (3)
for the home and foreign  rms respectively. The solutions, A and B, to (3)
depend only on k and k*. (The subsidy only affects these actions indirectly
through the investment decisions.) Hence, operating pro ts can be written as
functions of k and k*. The resulting ‘reduced-form’ operating pro t functions
are denoted by circum exes:
ˆp (k, k*) ; p [k, k*, A(k, k*), B(k, k*)] (4)
and
ˆp *(k, k*) ; p *[k, k*, A(k, k*), B(k, k*)] (5)
for the home and foreign  rms respectively.
Consider next the investment decisions in the pre-market period. For the
home  rm, it maximizes a reduced-form total pro t function, equal to (4)
plus subsidy revenue:
ˆp (k, k*, s) ; ˆp (k, k*) 1 sk (6)
Its  rst-order condition for optimal choice of investment is therefore:
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ˆp k (k, k*, s) 5 ˆp k (k, k*) 1 s 5 0 (7)
In words, the marginal return to investment, taking account of its strategic
effect on the actions in the market period, plus the investment subsidy, must
equal zero.
Similar derivations apply to the foreign  rm, with the simpli cation that
its pro ts do not depend directly on the investment subsidy. Maximizing (5)
gives the foreign  rm’s  rst-order condition for investment:
ˆp *k* (k, k
*) 5 0 (8)
This is a single equation in the two investment levels only. Hence, it
implicitly de nes the foreign  rm’s investment reaction function, giving k*
as a function of k. This function will play a crucial role below.
2.2 Welfare and the optimal investment subsidy
Consider next the behaviour of the home government. In order to focus on
strategic trade reasons for industrial policy we ignore domestic consumption
and assume that all output is exported. Hence, welfare equals the home
 rm’s pro ts net of subsidy payments:
W(k, k*) 5 ˆp (k, k*, s) 2 sk
5 ˆp (k, k*)
(9)
Because the welfare function is simply the home  rm’s operating pro ts, it
depends directly on home and foreign investment only and not on the
subsidy. Totally differentiate (9) and make use of the  rst-order condition
(7) to obtain:
dW 5 2 sdk 1 ˆp k*dk
* (10)
This gives the change in welfare as a function of changes in investment
levels. To solve this problem with two targets (k and k*) and one instrument
(s), it is helpful to think of the subsidy as giving the government direct
control over home investment, while foreign investment responds according
to the foreign  rm’s investment reaction function. Setting the change in wel-
fare dW equal to zero in (10) gives the solution for the optimal subsidy:
so 5 ˆp k*
dk*
dk
(11)
Following Brander (1995, Section 3.3.4), the sign of the optimal subsidy
depends on two key terms. The  rst is the effect of higher foreign
investment on home pro ts, given by the derivative ˆp k*. When this is
negative, we say that foreign investment is ‘unfriendly’ to the home  rm.
The second term is dk*/dk, the slope of the foreign investment reaction
function. When this is negative, so the reaction function is downward
sloping; we say, following Bulow et al. (1985), that foreign investment is a
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‘strategic substitute’ for home investment. Using the foreign  rm’s  rst-
order condition (8), the slope of the foreign reaction function can be written
in turn as:
dk*
dk
5 2
ˆp *k*k
ˆp *k*k*
(12)
The denominator is negative from the foreign  rm’s second-order condition
for pro t maximization. Hence the crucial term is the numerator, which
indicates whether foreign investment is a strategic substitute (numerator
negative) or strategic complement (numerator positive) for home
investment.
2.3 Inside the black box
So far, this is just as in Brander (1995): the sign of the optimal subsidy
depends solely on ‘friendliness’ and ‘strategic substitutability’, expressed in
terms of the  rst and second derivatives of the reduced-form pro t functions.
Brander’s conjecture that investment subsidies are a robust policy rule relies
on the presumption that investments (especially in cost-reducing R&D) are
likely to be unfriendly and strategic substitutes, the two negative signs
cancelling to give a positive sign for the optimal subsidy in (11).
To investigate whether these presumptions are general, we need to go
further by restating these derivatives in terms of the derivatives of the
original pro t functions, (1) and (2). Going inside the ‘black box’ of the
reduced-form pro t functions leads to more, rather than less, complicated
expressions for the key terms in the optimal subsidy formula (11). However,
it allows us to focus on the underlying determinants of optimal industrial
policy and also paves the way for considering a range of special cases in the
next section.
Consider  rst the friendliness term ˆp k*. Using the de nition of the
reduced-form pro t function ˆp in (4), this can be expressed as follows:
ˆp k* 5 p k* 1 p B Bk* (13)
(where p A has been set to zero since A is chosen optimally in the third
stage.) Friendliness therefore depends on two effects. The  rst is a pure
spillover effect, represented by the term p k*. The second is a strategic effect,
which depends on how increased foreign investment affects home pro ts,
through its effect on the foreign  rm’s own action in the market period.
From Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), we know that many kinds of investment
have a negative strategic effect, tending (in their terminology) to make the
investing  rm ‘tough’ by lowering its rival’s pro ts. But other kinds of
investment make the investing  rm ‘soft’. (We will see examples of both
types in Section 3.) So there is no presumption that investment levels are
unfriendly, even in the absence of spillovers.3
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Consider next the strategic substitutability term. Return to the foreign
 rm’s marginal pro tability of investment, equation (8), but now use (5) to
express it in terms of the derivatives of the original pro t function:
ˆp *k* 5 p
*
k* 1 p
*
A Ak* (14)
(where once again the direct effect p *B has been set to zero since B is chosen
optimally in the third stage). Differentiating this with respect to k gives:
ˆp *k*k 5 p
*
k*k 1 p
*
k*A Ak 1 p
*
k*B Bk
1 ( p *Ak 1 p
*
A A Ak 1 p
*
A B Bk) Ak* 1 p
*
A Ak*k
(15)
In a sense, equation (15) is the main result of the paper. However, for the
present, its implications are largely negative. Without further restrictions
there is little basis for determining the sign of this expression.4 For example,
the  rst two terms in each line, p *k*k and p
*
Ak, re ect the role of spillovers
whereby changes in home investment k directly affect the responsiveness of
the foreign  rm’s pro ts to changes in k* and A. As we will see, spillovers
have very different effects depending on whether they arise on the produc-
tion side (such as R&D spillovers) or the demand side (such as marketing or
consumer switching cost spillovers). Even if we rule out direct spillovers, so
that p * does not depend directly on k and thus p *k*k 5 p
*
Ak 5 0, there is still a
key ambiguity in the  nal term in (15), Ak*k. This term can never be signed
in general since it depends on the third derivatives of the home and foreign
pro t functions.
These considerations cast doubt on the suggestion of Brander (1995) that
investment levels are always likely to be strategic substitutes. However, it
would be going too far to rest a case for non-robustness of the positive-
investment-subsidy policy rule on such considerations. The theory of oligop-
oly has many examples of results that are not robust to changes in functional
form but which are nevertheless accepted as convenient rules of thumb.5 To
throw more light on the issue we need to turn instead to consider the sign of
the optimal subsidy under plausible special assumptions, while keeping
equations (13) and (15) in mind.
3 SOME SPECIAL CASES
We begin with a benchmark case in which competition is Cournot, invest-
ment serves to reduce costs, there are no spillovers and  rms are symmetric.
We then consider the effects of relaxing these assumptions in turn. Through-
out, we concentrate on simple functional forms: linear demand and invest-
ment functions and quadratic investment cost functions. Rather than solving
each game in full, we need only calculate the derivatives of the pro t
functions (using the results in the Appendix) and substitute them into the
general expressions (13) and (15). The results are summarized in Table 1.
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3.1 Cost-reducing investment followed by Cournot competition
R&D incurs quadratic costs in the pre-market period, equal to g k2/2 and
g k*2/2 for the home and foreign  rms respectively. The bene ts accrue in the
form of reductions in the marginal cost parameters c and c* (assumed to be
independent of output):
c 5 c0 2 u k
c* 5 c0 2 u k
* (16)
As for demands, we allow for differentiated products, with the prices of
home and foreign goods denoted by p and q respectively:6
p 5 a 2 b(x 1 ey)
q 5 a* 2 b(y 1 ex)
(17)
(where e # 1 is an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation).
Under these assumptions, it is immediate that investment levels are
unfriendly: an increase in foreign investment raises the equilibrium level of
foreign output in the market period, and this directly reduces home sales and
pro ts. Less immediate, though just as intuitive, is that investment levels are
strategic substitutes.7 An increase in home investment lowers foreign sales,
which, because the bene ts of lower costs are spread more thinly, directly
reduces the marginal pro tability of foreign investment (the  rst, non-
strategic, term on the right-hand side of (14)). An increase in home
investment also reduces the foreign  rm’s return from pushing the home
 rm down its output reaction function, so reducing the second strategic term
on the right-hand side of (14). For both reasons, higher home investment
lowers the marginal pro tability of foreign investment, and so investment
levels are strategic substitutes. It follows immediately that the optimal policy
is an investment subsidy. By encouraging more home investment, this
reduces equilibrium foreign investment, which in turn shifts pro ts towards
the home  rm.
It is instructive to look at the explicit expressions for the two key terms.
(They can be read from the  rst row of Table 1, setting the spillover
parameter f equal to zero.) The friendliness term in equation (13) can be
written as:
ˆp k* 5 2
e
4 2 e2
2 u x (18)
This con rms that investment levels are unfriendly. Similarly, the strategic
substitutability term from equation (15) is:8
ˆp *k*k 5 2
e
4 2 e2
m h g (19)
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So investment levels are strategic substitutes. Moreover, it is clear that the
determinants of friendliness and strategic substitutability are very similar.
We will see this pattern recurring below.
The linear-quadratic model of this subsection is a special case of that of
Spencer and Brander (1983), who allowed for a nonlinear demand function,
and showed that, with appropriate additional restrictions, an investment
subsidy remains optimal. Unfortunately, this robustness does not extend to
the other models we consider.
3.2 Bertrand competition
How are these results affected when  rms engage in price or Bertrand
competition rather than quantity or Cournot competition? To examine this
case it is convenient to switch from inverse to direct demand functions:9
x 5 a 2 b (p 2 e q)
y 5 a * 2 b (q 2 e p)
(20)
It is well-known that actions (prices in this case) are now strategic
complements rather than strategic substitutes: p B is positive rather than
negative. Less well-known, although clear from a careful reading of Bagwell
and Staiger (1994), is that investment subsidies remain optimal, if exports
cannot be directly taxed or subsidized. The detailed chain of causation is
different. For example, higher home investment now lowers rather than
raises the foreign  rm’s action (its price). However, the effect on foreign
pro ts is the same as in the Cournot case: they fall, so investment levels are
unfriendly. Similarly, the different terms in the key second cross-derivative
(15) have little in common (compare the  rst and second rows in Table 1)
yet it remains true that investment levels are strategic substitutes. Explicit
calculation (using the expressions in the second row of Table 1, with the
spillover parameter f set equal to zero) shows that the expressions for the
friendliness and strategic substitutability terms are identical to those in the
Cournot case, equations (18) and (19) (except that e replaces e). Hence an
investment subsidy is still optimal.
3.3 Market-expanding investment
The next application we consider is to the case of market-expanding
investment. The simplest way to model this is to assume that investment
raises the intercepts of the demand functions. For the inverse demand
functions this implies:
a 5 a0 1 u k and a
* 5 a0 1 k
* (21)
Similarly for the direct demand functions:10
a 5 a 0 1 b u k and a
* 5 a 0 1 b u k
* (22)
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As in the case of cost-reducing investment, we assume quadratic investment
costs: g k2/2 and g k*2/2 for the home and foreign  rms respectively. How-
ever, we assume that marginal production cost c is constant for both
 rms.
It is easy to show that, when  rms choose quantities, the game with
market-expanding investment is effectively identical to that with cost-
reducing investment. In both cases the only direct effect of investment is to
raise the price-marginal-cost margin; for example, the home  rm’s is:
p 2 c 5 a0 2 c0 2 b(x 1 ey) 1 u k, irrespective of whether u re ects cost-
reducing or market-expanding investment. Hence, there is no need for a
separate row in Table 1 corresponding to this case: all the terms in the
expressions are unchanged. In particular, the friendliness and strategic
substitutability terms continue to be given by equations (18) and (19)
respectively, and so the optimal investment subsidy is still positive.
Matters are more interesting when  rms compete in prices. A rise in
foreign investment now raises the price at which the foreign  rm can sell its
product. This price increase translates directly into an increase in home
pro ts. So, for the  rst time, investment levels are friendly. Formally, the
relevant expression is almost identical to that in the case of cost-reducing
investment with Bertrand competition, except that its sign is reversed:
ˆp k* 5
e
4 2 e 2
2 u x (23)
This might suggest that the optimal investment subsidy is now negative. But
this is not so, because investment levels now turn out to be strategic
complements. The reason is that all the arguments of Section 3.1 are
reversed. For example, an increase in home investment raises foreign sales,
so tending to increase the marginal pro tability of foreign investment. Once
again, the relevant expression is identical to that in the case of cost-reducing
investment with Bertrand competition, except that its sign is reversed:
ˆp *k*k 5
e
4 2 e 2
m h g (24)
Hence, when investment is market-expanding and  rms compete on price,
the relationships between home and foreign investment are diametrically
opposite to those in the previous cases we have considered. Since the
changes are mutually offsetting, a positive investment subsidy is once again
optimal.
3.4 Investment spillovers
So far, we have considered the case where each  rm’s investment affects
only its own cost or demand function. But inter- rm spillovers are plausible
for both kinds of investment, and they might be expected to alter the
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relationship between pro tability and rival investment levels.11 Consider, for
example, the case in which investment is cost-reducing. The model is as
before except that each  rm’s marginal cost parameter is reduced not only
by its own investment but also by its rival’s:
c 5 c0 2 u (k 1 f k
*)
c* 5 c0 2 u (k
* 1 f k)
(25)
where f is the spillover parameter. (Demand spillovers are modelled
similarly: see Table 1 for details.12) It is intuitively obvious that, for
suf ciently high f , investment levels may become friendly: in equation (13),
the spillover effect (whereby foreign investment directly lowers home costs
and so raises home pro ts) may be suf cient to offset the strategic effect.
Does this mean that the earlier conclusions about optimal investment
policy are reversed? Surprisingly, the answer is no. While it is true that
investment levels may be friendly rather than unfriendly, exactly the same
parameter values that give this outcome also imply that they become
strategic complements rather than strategic substitutes. Clearly this conclu-
sion is sensitive to the special linear-quadratic assumptions we have made.
However, it is remarkable that it holds for all the speci cations we have
considered so far: Cournot or Bertrand competition, with either cost-
reducing or market-expanding investment. To avoid unnecessary taxonomy,
we simply refer to Table 1, where the detailed expressions are given. The
conclusion is thus that, although  rm conduct and market behaviour are
greatly affected by investment or demand spillovers, an investment subsidy
continues to be the optimal policy in all cases.
3.5 Asymmetric  rms
So far we have assumed that investment either reduces marginal costs or
increases market demand. Of course, some forms of investment may do
both. Even in this case, our analysis extends straightforwardly to show that
the optimal industrial policy is still a subsidy, provided the investments
affect both  rms symmetrically. However, consider instead an asymmetric
case. Assume, for example, that the home  rm’s investment is cost-reducing
but the foreign  rm’s is market-expanding. (Ignore spillovers for the
moment.) Assume also that  rms compete on price. Then, from Section 3.3,
we know that foreign investment is friendly to the home  rm. The foreign
 rm’s investment raises its price, which then raises home pro t. But we also
know from Section 3.3 that home investment is a strategic substitute for
foreign investment, tending to reduce the rival’s marginal pro tability.13
Hence, for the  rst time we have a simple and not unrealistic example where
the home government should tax investment. The resulting decrease in home
investment leads to an increase in the rival  rm’s market-expanding invest-
ment, thus increasing both the foreign and home prices. Home pro ts may
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rise or fall (helped by higher foreign investment, harmed by the tax) but the
gain in tax revenue ensures that home welfare rises.
A different example where an investment tax is optimal, is where
spillovers are asymmetric. Now, irrespective of the nature of competition or
the type of investment, there exist parameter values that make investment
levels friendly for one  rm but strategic substitutes for the other. In the case
of Cournot competition, for example, this is true when the parameter
measuring the extent of spillovers to the foreign  rm, f *, lies on the opposite
side of the term e/2 from the parameter measuring the extent of spillovers to
the home  rm, f . Such a con guration would arise in the plausible case
where the foreign  rm has a technological advantage and so has less to gain
from spillovers than the home  rm, so f * , e/2 , f . Now a tax on the home
 rm leads it to reduce its investment, which encourages the foreign  rm to
invest more (because investments are strategic substitutes for the foreign
 rm); this in turn tends to raise home pro ts (because investments are
friendly for the home  rm). Once again, therefore, we see that it is
asymmetries that are crucial in overturning the presumption that an invest-
ment subsidy is optimal.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have re-examined the rationale for direct investment
subsidies to  rms competing against foreign rivals in oligopolistic markets.
We  rst considered a model with general functional forms, and derived the
standard result that the sign of the optimal subsidy depends on two key
questions:  rst, whether investments are ‘friendly’, in the sense that higher
foreign investment raises home pro ts; and second, whether investments are
‘strategic substitutes’, in the sense that higher home investment lowers the
marginal pro tability of foreign investment. We then related these two
considerations to the properties of the underlying pro t functions and
showed that neither can be signed unambiguously. This suggests that the
theoretical case for a positive investment subsidy is not robust.
The ambiguity of the general model is a puzzle in itself, since all previous
studies have found that, when direct assistance to exports is ruled out,
positive investment subsidies are justi ed. We therefore turned to some
special models, to try and isolate the features that work in favour of
industrial policy. We began with a benchmark case in which competition is
Cournot, investment serves to reduce costs, there are no spillovers and  rms
are symmetric. Following Spencer and Brander (1983), this yielded clear-cut
results: investment levels were both unfriendly and strategic substitutes, or,
in plainer language, an increase in investment by one  rm reduced its rival’s
pro ts both in total and at the margin. As a consequence, a domestic subsidy
to investment was justi ed: by increasing home investment, this reduced
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foreign investment (because of strategic substitutability) which in turn raised
home pro ts (because of unfriendliness).
We then considered the consequences of relaxing each of the benchmark
assumptions in turn. Switching from Cournot or quantity competition to
Bertrand or price competition affects the detailed workings of the model, but
leaves the central policy conclusion unaffected. More surprisingly, with
market-expanding rather than cost-reducing investment, and with inter- rm
spillovers, an investment subsidy remains optimal. This is despite the fact
that the mechanisms operating in the various cases were very different. For
example, with either market-expanding investment or strong spillovers,
investments may be friendly and strategic complements. However, these two
reversals of the benchmark case always occur for the same parameter values
and so they offset each other.
The only cases we found where an investment tax was warranted was
where the two  rms were asymmetric, either in the sign of the spillovers
between them or in the effects of their investments. Thus, for example, if
home investment tends to expand the size of the market (and competition is
Bertrand) both  rms bene t, so investments are friendly; if, at the same
time, foreign investment tends to reduce costs, then investments are strategic
substitutes. In such cases a tax on home investment would be welfare-
increasing.
Why is it that investment subsidies are optimal in so many special cases
(including all those examined so far in the literature), whereas the general
formulae are so ambiguous? One heuristic explanation is that the two key
concepts tend to be closely associated in simple cases: ‘friendliness’ refers to
the effect of one  rm’s investment on its rival’s total pro ts, whereas
‘strategic substitutability’ refers to the effect of one  rm’s investment on its
rival’s marginal pro ts. With simple functional forms these two concepts
tend to have the same sign. Arbitrary nonlinearities in investment or demand
functions can always be found that will lead to their having different signs.
As we have noted, however, this would be a weak basis for a case against
investment subsidies.
It need hardly be stressed that the issues considered in this paper concern
only part of the objections that have been raised to the interventionist thrust
of strategic trade policy. Even in the benchmark case of Cournot competi-
tion, subsidization of either exports or investment may not be optimal if
there are many home  rms, if foreign governments also subsidize, if some of
the additional pro ts are captured by domestic factors, or if the opportunity
cost of public funds exceeds unity. (See Brander, 1995, for a review of these
arguments and further references.) Moreover, it is surely true that much
assistance to private industry is driven in practice by special-interest
politics.
A different objection to investment subsidies is made in our earlier work
(Neary and Leahy, 2000), where we considered the jointly optimal choice of
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investment and export subsidies. We stressed there that in these models there
are two separate grounds for intervention:  rst, to restore ef ciency in
investment; and, second, to manipulate optimally the foreign  rm by
subsidizing or taxing home exports. Attaining the ‘ rst-best’ outcome
therefore requires two instruments, both an investment and an export subsidy
or tax.14 Hence, if exports cannot be subsidized (or taxed), the case for
subsidizing investment alone is only a second-best one. We also presented
some simulation results which suggest that, even when an investment
subsidy is optimal, it is unlikely to bridge much of the gap between the free-
trade and  rst-best welfare levels; and the optimal subsidy rate is unlikely to
be large.
For all these reasons, the practical case for strategic industrial policy is
questionable. Nevertheless, it is striking that the qualitative policy recom-
mendation is relatively unaffected by changes in assumptions about demand,
technology and  rm behaviour. Although positive subsidies to investment
are not a very robust recommendation, they are considerably more robust
than positive subsidies to exports.
APPENDIX
Totally differentiating the  rst-order conditions for actions given in (3):
F p AA p ABp *BA p *BBG F dAdBG 5 2 F p Ak dk 1 p Ak* dk*p *Bk dk 1 p *Bk* dk*G (26)
The diagonal elements in the left-hand side coef cient matrix are negative
from the home and foreign second-order conditions for actions; the off-
diagonal elements are negative if and only if the two actions are strategic
substitutes; and the determinant (denoted by D ) must be positive for
stability. Solving (26) gives the derivatives of the solutions for A(k,k*) and
B(k,k*):
F Ak Ak*Bk Bk*G 5 1D F 2 p *BBp Ak 1 p AB p *Bk p ABp *Bk* 2 p *BBp Ak*p *BAp Ak 2 p AAp *Bk 2 p AAp *Bk* 1 p *BAp Ak* G (27)
If there are no spillovers, the second term in each expression in the right-
hand side matrix vanishes, since the cross-derivatives p *Bk and p Ak* are
zero.
NOTES
A version of this paper was presented to the conference on Dynamics, Economic Growth
and International Trade, University of Rome, La Sapienza, June 2000, and to ETSG 2000
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in Glasgow. We are grateful to participants on these occasions, especially Luca de
Benedictis, and to two referees, for helpful comments. Peter Neary’s research was carried
out while visiting the Laboratoire d’Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris, and forms
part of the Globalization Programme of the Centre for Economic Performance at LSE,
funded by the UK ESRC.
1 Spencer and Brander (1983) were the  rst to consider this issue, in a model where
 rms  rst invest in cost-reducing R&D and than engage in Cournot competition.
Bagwell and Staiger (1994) considered the case of R&D that reduces costs
stochastically, followed by Bertrand competition with linear demands. In the case
that most resembles the deterministic one (where R&D reduces the mean but does
not alter the variance of the cost distribution), they found that an R&D subsidy is
optimal. Maggi (1996) considered a simpli ed version of the model of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983) in which second-period competition is Bertrand, but the
outcome of the full game may resemble that of either a Cournot or a Bertrand one-
period game, depending on the slope of the marginal cost function. Neary and Leahy
(2000) provide a general framework for this literature, and stress the second-best
nature of the case where an export subsidy is unavailable.
2 Yet another consideration in favour of concentrating on industrial policy is that,
before investment decisions have been made, governments are more likely to be able
to commit to investment than to export subsidies. As Leahy and Neary (1996, 1999)
and Grossman and Maggi (1998) have shown, intervention when governments
cannot commit to subsidies may lead to lower welfare than free trade.
3 Fudenberg and Tirole’s categorization of investment differs from Brander’s in two
respects. First, they do not consider pure spillover effects, as given by the  rst term
on the right-hand side of (13). Second, they assume a qualitative symmetry of the
effects of market-period actions on rival’s pro ts, so that p *A has the same sign as p B.
As we shall see in Section 3, this is a crucial assumption.
4 The terms giving the effects of investment on market-period actions (Ak, Bk, etc) can
be calculated explicitly, as in equation (27) in the Appendix. However, substituting
these solutions into (15) does not help in either interpreting or signing the
expression.
5 Examples include the assumption that actions are strategic substitutes in Cournot
competition and strategic complements in Bertrand competition, both of which can
fail to hold for particular con gurations of the second derivatives of the demand
functions.
6 Allowing for differentiated products makes little difference in the Cournot case. The
extra notation is justi ed since it facilitates comparison with the Bertrand case,
where we need to assume that products are differentiated in order to guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies.
7 Under the linear-quadratic assumptions made here, many of the terms in (15) vanish,
and the expression reduces to: ˆp *k*k 5 ( p
*
k*B 1 p
*
ABAk*)Bk. These two remaining terms
give, respectively, the changes in the non-strategic and strategic terms in (14)
induced by an increase in k. Their values can be read from the  rst row of
Table 1.
8 Here and later, as in our earlier work (Leahy and Neary, 1996; Neary and Leahy,
2000), we use two composite parameters to express the results in a more compact
way. The  rst, h , measures the non-strategic relative return to investment: h ; u 2/
b g . In the absence of strategic behaviour, the  rst-order condition for investment is:
p k 5 u x 2 g k 5 0. Hence the non-strategic return to investment is u ; while its cost
can be measured by the induced fall in price: dp/dk 5 ( ¶ p/¶ x)( ¶ x/¶ k) 5 b g / u . The
ratio of these gives h . The second parameter, m , measures the strategic component
in the marginal return to investment per unit output: m 5 4/(4 2 e2). The  rst-order
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condition including the strategic effect is ˆp k 5 m u x 2 g k 5 0, so when (as here) m
exceeds one, there is strategic over-investment. Both of the parameters h and m must
be positive.
9 If e , 1 and all demand parameters are independent of investment levels, the direct
demand functions in (20) can be derived from the inverse demand functions in (17),
and e 5 e. However, with market-expanding investment as in Sections 3.3 and 3.4
below, the two sets of demand functions are not directly related. Hence we do not
require that e equal e in all cases.
10 Although, recall from an earlier footnote that these speci cations of the inverse and
direct demand functions are not mutually compatible. The absence of investment
spillovers in one implies that they must be present in the other.
11 For the case of cost-reducing investment and Cournot competition, this was noted by
Henriques (1990) in a comment on d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
12 One difference with demand spillovers is that h may be negative rather than
positive. The only restriction that must hold is that its value cannot be such that the
marginal return to investment per unit output, m (given in the  nal column of Table
1), is negative.
13 Note that investments are strategic substitutes for the foreign  rm, so its investment
reaction function slopes downwards. But they are strategic complements for the
home  rm, so its investment reaction function slopes upwards. It can be checked
that the equilibrium is nevertheless stable.
14 We write ‘ rst-best’ in inverted commas, since the oligopolistic market structure is
taken as given and only domestic welfare is considered.
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